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Abstract 
 
We outline and test two theories of foreign direct investment based on capital market mispricing. 
The “cheap assets” or “fire-sale” theory considers FDI inflows as the purchase of undervalued 
host country assets, while the “cheap financial capital” theory views FDI outflows as a natural 
use of the relatively low-cost capital available to overvalued firms in the source country. The 
results are consistent with the cheap financial capital theory: FDI flows are unrelated to host 
country stock market valuations, as measured by the aggregate market-to-book-value ratio, but 
are strongly positively related to source country valuations and negatively related to future 
source country stock returns, especially when capital account restrictions limit cross-country 
arbitrage.  
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Abstract 
 
We outline and test two theories of foreign direct investment based on capital market mispricing. 
The “cheap assets” or “fire-sale” theory considers FDI inflows as the purchase of undervalued 
host country assets, while the “cheap financial capital” theory views FDI outflows as a natural 
use of the relatively low-cost capital available to overvalued firms in the source country. The 
results are consistent with the cheap financial capital theory: FDI flows are unrelated to host 
country stock market valuations, as measured by the aggregate market-to-book-value ratio, but 
are strongly positively related to source country valuations and negatively related to future 
source country stock returns, especially when capital account restrictions limit cross-country 
arbitrage.  
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I. Introduction 
Since the influential dissertation by Hymer (1960), most of the literature on the 
determinants of foreign direct investment assumes that international capital markets are 
integrated and informationally efficient, or at least integrated and efficient enough so that capital-
market arbitrage does not have significant power in explaining patterns in FDI flows. Instead this 
work has focused on the roles of host country market size, production scale economies, shifting 
comparative advantages, trade and investment barriers, and tax rates.1 Without denying the 
importance of those “fundamental” determinants of FDI, this paper reconsiders the role of capital 
market prices. Specifically, we outline and test theories of how FDI is affected by country-level 
stock market valuations. 
 The need to reconsider the role of capital market prices in FDI is evidenced by recent 
empirical findings, and parallel theoretical developments, which show that the same capital asset 
can trade at different prices in different markets at a given point in time. For example, Froot and 
Dabora (1999) study the shares of Royal Dutch, which trades mainly in the US, and Shell 
Transport, which trades mainly in the UK. Royal Dutch and Shell pay dividends in a 60:40 ratio 
in accord with a longstanding merger agreement. Were capital markets informationally efficient 
and integrated, the relative share price would also be fixed at this ratio. In reality, the actual price 
ratio varies from 36:40 to 66:40 over Froot and Dabora’s sample period. Moreover, the relative 
                                                 
1 Models of horizontal investment, such as Markusen (1984), predict more investment in larger markets where gains 
from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of building additional capacity. Models of vertical investment, such as 
Helpman (1984), describe the incentive to locate production to take advantage of factor cost differences. Empirical 
evidence on these channels include Brainard (1997), Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), Blonigen, Davies, and 
Head (2003), and Yeaple (2003). Gordon and Hines (2004) survey the literature on the effect of host country tax 
rates on FDI. A notable exception to the focus on non-financial factors is Froot and Stein (1991). They focus on 
information problems in financial contracting, but maintain the assumption of globally integrated and 
informationally efficient markets. We return to this theory, and related empirical studies, later in the paper. 
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price of Royal Dutch increases when the US market increases relative to the UK market, strongly 
suggesting the existence of broad, country-level investor demand pressures. 
Given that the share prices of Royal Dutch and Shell are set on two of the best-
functioning capital markets in the world, and that other “Siamese twin” shares display similar 
behavior, one must take seriously the possibility that relative mispricing of corporate assets 
across international capital markets is fairly widespread.2 The evidence also raises the possibility 
that the dismissal of capital market misvaluation as an influence on FDI may have been 
premature. 
 We outline two basic types of mispricing-driven FDI. The first is a simple “cheap assets” 
or “fire sale” theory. In this theory, FDI inflows are the purchase of undervalued host country 
assets. This idea is expressed often in the financial press and has been developed by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992), and especially Krugman (1998) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004). The second 
theory we consider is a “cheap financial capital” theory. Here, FDI outflows are viewed as a 
natural use of the relatively low-cost financial capital available to overvalued source country 
firms. To the extent that FDI is cross-border M&A, as opposed to greenfield investment, this 
latter theory is an application of Shleifer and Vishny (2003)’s model of misvaluation-driven 
acquisitions to a cross-border setting.  
After outlining these novel perspectives on FDI in more detail, we test them. We focus on 
the relationship between country-level stock market valuations and cross-country FDI patterns. 
In some versions of the mispricing-driven FDI theories, stock prices play a direct role as firms 
                                                 
2 Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), and de Jong, Rosenthal, and van Dijk (2004) discuss other 
cases of “Siamese twin” shares whose relative price behavior seems best explained by some form of relative market 
mispricing. Studies of country closed-end funds by Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994) and Bodurtha, Kim, 
and Lee (1995) offer another clean setting in which the valuation of a set of cash flows appears to depend on where 
it trades. Bekaert (1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1995), and Henry (2000) find evidence of stock market segmentation 
in broader samples of countries and firms. For surveys of the literature on capital market inefficiencies, including 
why mispricings are not always arbitraged away, see Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2003). 
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issue new equity or buy firms abroad with overvalued equity. In others they affect FDI as a 
consequence of their influence on perceived collateral values which are a determinant of the cost 
of debt. Our main sample merges the US Bureau of Economic Analysis panel of FDI flows and 
the extended international stock market valuation and returns data assembled by Fama and 
French (1998). The BEA panel includes FDI flows between the US and nineteen other countries 
from 1974 to 2001. For robustness, we also study the mergers and acquisitions component of US 
FDI in isolation, as well as a larger panel of bilateral FDI flows among twenty countries.  
The empirical results tell a consistent story: The cheap assets channel is unimportant, at 
least as a general determinant of FDI, whereas the cheap financial capital channel may be very 
important. We start with simple regressions which show that FDI outflows are strongly 
positively related to the average market-equity-to-book-equity-value ratio of publicly traded 
firms in the source country, potentially consistent with cheap financial capital, while FDI inflows 
are unrelated to the market-to-book ratios of host countries, inconsistent with fire sales. These 
results appear in all three FDI data sets and are robust to various specification choices. Indeed, 
source country valuations have a statistically stronger effect than almost any of the standard 
regressors in FDI equations. An initial implication is that the effect of the ratio of country-level 
stock market capitalizations, the “relative wealth” effect documented in Klein and Rosengren 
(1994) and Dewenter (1995), is actually one-sided, in the direction of the cheap financial capital 
explanation.  
Of course, stock valuations capture not only mispricing but also many other determinants 
of FDI, so these results are only suggestive. Three further findings, motivated by a fairly general 
empirical methodology, support the presence of an independent misvaluation effect. First, we 
apply the logic that mispricings tend to correct over time, and use ex post stock market returns to 
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instrument for the component of market-to-book that reflects ex ante mispricing. We find that 
FDI outflows are strongly related to this component. Second, we use the observation that capital 
controls limit cross-market arbitrage and thus, other things equal, increase the likelihood that an 
extreme value of market-to-book reflects mispricing. We find that source country valuations 
indeed have stronger effects in the presence of capital controls. Third, we combine the power of 
these two approaches. We find that the component of source country market-to-book associated 
with mispricing has its strongest effect when capital accounts are closed, just as predicted. These 
findings are consistent with the cheap financial capital story, but they are not implied by theories 
in which capital markets are integrated and informationally efficient.3 
 In summary, we find new evidence that capital market mispricing, long an ignored factor 
in the FDI literature, may actually have an important effect on FDI patterns. In particular, the 
evidence is consistent with a cheap financial capital channel but not a cheap assets channel. One 
caveat is that, while our data include the majority of world FDI flows, they focus on developed 
countries. Thus, our results do not necessarily conflict with Aguiar and Gopinath’s (2004) 
evidence of fire sales in a small set of developing countries in a crisis period; they just cast doubt 
on undervalued assets as a general driving force in FDI flows. Overall, the results add some 
novel hypotheses and robust new facts to the FDI literature. More broadly, they suggest that the 
literature on how mispricing affects investment and merger activity within countries, recently 
surveyed by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004), may also shed light on cross-country data.  
                                                 
3 For example, although Froot and Stein (1991), among others, consider the effects of information problems in 
financial contracting, they assume that international capital markets are integrated and efficient at incorporating 
public information, and they do not make predictions about the relationship between FDI flows and future stock 
market returns. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the mispricing-based 
theories of FDI. Section III presents the methodology and the data. Section IV contains the 
empirical results. Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Two types of mispricing-driven FDI 
As mentioned above, most theories of FDI assume integrated and informationally 
efficient world capital markets, an assumption that contrasts with casual observation as well as 
the “Siamese twins” and related empirical evidence. Just as any relative mispricing of two assets 
implies that at least one of the assets must be under- or overpriced on an absolute basis, one can 
distinguish two basic types of mispricing-driven FDI: the first emphasizes the undervaluation of 
the assets being bought, and the second is driven by overvaluation of the buyer. After describing 
these views of FDI, we explain why multinationals are well positioned to exploit misvaluations.  
A. Cheap assets 
The “cheap assets” story views FDI as the (cross-border) purchase of temporarily 
undervalued assets. To be precise, by undervalued we mean that assets are priced lower than the 
theoretical, integrated-and-efficient-world-capital-market benchmark price. Undervaluation 
could follow from a collapse in investor sentiment for host country assets that takes the form of a 
stock market crash. Alternatively, it could be sparked by a liquidity crisis in the host country that 
causes liquidity-constrained firms to be available at fire sale valuations to unconstrained foreign 
buyers. The latter story is similar to Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and in particular Krugman 
(1998) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004).  
Stock market prices can have either a direct effect, such as when a stock market crash 
reduces valuations below fundamental levels, or indirect effects. In a liquidity crisis, low 
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valuations might be largely driven by the perceived inability of local firms to pursue domestic 
investment opportunities. To the extent that valuations of unlisted firms are correlated with those 
of listed firms, stock market valuations would then be best seen as a proxy for the valuation of 
domestic capital assets in general. 
Although this sort of explanation for FDI is frequently cited in popular accounts, there is 
little rigorous evidence, and, to our knowledge, virtually no large-sample investigation that spans 
many countries and a broad time period. The avialable evidence includes Aguiar and Gopinath 
(2004), who find that cross-border M&A increased in five Asian countries during the late-1990s 
crisis and that foreign acquirers concentrated on liquidity-constrained firms; and Chari, Ouimet, 
and Tesar (2004), who find that merger announcement returns are not higher for deals involving 
targets in developing countries during times of crisis.  
B. Cheap financial capital  
In the “cheap financial capital” channel, FDI represents a natural use of temporarily low-
cost financial capital (again, versus the theoretical benchmark cost of capital) enjoyed by 
overvalued firms in the source country. To the extent that much FDI is cross-border M&A, one 
version of this theory of FDI is simply the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model of mispricing-
driven acquisitions in a cross-border setting. There, managers of an overvalued acquirer know 
that their overpricing will end eventually, but in the meantime they benefit their ongoing 
investors, at the expense of new ones, by purchasing less-overvalued assets with new capital. For 
firms overvalued due to a domestic bubble, for example, candidate investments would include 
overseas targets that are not overvalued as well as zero-net-present value greenfield investment.  
The cheap financial capital channel can be operative even if firms do not issue new 
shares or buy foreign firms with overvalued equity. By its effect on perceived collateral values, 
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overpriced equity can also reduce the cost of debt, and thus can also stimulate cash-financed 
FDI. For instance, in a manner reminiscent of the balance sheet channel in Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000), widely-used credit scoring models, such as 
those of Moody’s KMV, use share prices as an input to assess credit risk. Overpriced shares thus 
can lead to an abnormally low cost of debt.  
In addition, typical extensions of credit scoring models (such as KMV’s Private Firm 
Model) estimate credit risk for private firms using stock market valuations for comparable public 
firms. The widespread use of such models suggests how a stock market bubble can reduce the 
cost of capital of nontraded firms as well. Since parent companies are often thought to implicitly 
guarantee affiliate’s debt, as explained by Caves (1996, p. 139), mispricing in the source country 
can also affect the cost of capital raised in host countries by affiliates. As a consequence of these 
considerations and data constraints, we do not focus on financing patterns in our empirical tests 
of the cheap financial capital story. 
A related literature presents some evidence that the cheap financial capital story is helpful 
in explaining investment and merger activity within countries. For example, stock market 
valuations are strong determinants of equity issuance, and both new equity and debt issues are 
followed by low stock returns, consistent with the timing of new issuance to price peaks that are 
subsequently corrected. Some research also supports the mispricing-driven acquisitions theory in 
US data.4 However, to our knowledge, we are the first to outline and test a cheap financial capital 
theory of FDI. 
                                                 
4 Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004) survey this literature. Studies connecting valuations to equity issuance include 
Marsh (1982), Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996), Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 
(1998), and Graham and Harvey (2001). Loughran and Ritter (1995), Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1995), and Baker 
and Wurgler (2000), among others, find that equity issuers earn low subsequent stock returns, while Speiss and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) and Richardson and Sloan (2003) find the same for debt issuers. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and 
Weisbach (2004) find similar patterns in cross-border issues. Fischer and Merton (1984), Barro (1990), Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993), Stein (1996), Chirinko and Schaller (2001, 
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Finally, we note that in addition to having more evidence already on its side, there is at 
least one respect in which the cheap financial capital view seems more plausible than the cheap 
assets view. It asks a manager to identify misvaluation only in his own firm, as opposed to that of 
a target asset that may be located thousands of miles away.  
C. Why multinational arbitrage? 
An important broader question is why cross-market arbitrage would be left to 
multinationals, as opposed to portfolio investors. While we are not suggesting that all arbitrage is 
performed by multinationals, they do have some advantages in conducting cross-market arbitrage 
vis-à-vis, say, hedge fund managers. For example, consider a hedge fund manager who sells 
short to exploit a perceived overpricing of his country’s stock market. If the mispricing gets 
worse before it corrects, he may have to close the position at a loss due to margin requirements 
or agency relationships that shorten his horizon [Shleifer (2000), ch. 2 and ch. 4]. Consistent 
with such factors, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that US hedge funds typically chose to 
ride the US Internet bubble rather than trade against it. The manager of an overvalued 
multinational, on the other hand, is in a better position. If she raises external finance to acquire 
overseas assets and her firm’s shares subsequently appreciate further, her shareholders are 
unlikely to be upset. Stein (2004) makes a similar argument.  
In summary, the theories in this section are not intended to suggest that capital market 
arbitrage is the sole determinant of FDI, nor that multinationals are the only or even the most 
important cross-country arbitrageurs. However, we believe that these theories present additional 
                                                                                                                                                             
2004), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Polk and Sapienza (2003), and Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman 
(2003) study the connection between investment and stock market mispricing. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and 
Teoh (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2004) argue that mispricing affects merger activity in 
US data. In contrast, Brav and Gompers (1997) and Fama (1998) challenge the abnormality of the low returns after 
equity issues, while Harford (2004) argues for fundamental shocks, not market timing, as driving US merger waves.  
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plausible explanations of FDI flows that have been neglected by most of the work since Hymer 
(1960). 
 
III.  Methodology and data 
A.  Methodology 
The empirical hypotheses of interest are that FDI is higher when the capital in the source 
country is cheaper (i.e., when the source country stock market is overvalued), and that FDI is 
higher when the assets in the host country are cheaper (i.e., when the host country stock market 
is undervalued). The econometric challenge is to separately identify the effect of stock market 
misvaluation from the effects of other influences on FDI, in particular those that are also 
reflected in stock market valuations. We describe our methodology in terms of identifying the 
effect of source country valuations, i.e. in terms of evaluating predictions of the cheap financial 
capital story. The analysis for host country valuations is symmetric.  
Suppose that the FDI flow from source country i to host country j is given by 
ijtjtHitSitijt ccbaFDI 1εφφδ ++++= , (1) 
where δ is the degree of overvaluation in country i at time t and φk measures fundamentals in 
country k. Fundamentals are measured by a potentially long vector of country characteristics, 
which might in principle include the level of human capital, legal or technological development, 
profitable investment opportunities, and other fundamental (i.e., non-mispricing) determinants of 
FDI, multiplied by a set of loadings. We are interested in whether b is greater than zero. 
The first approach is to run regressions using the country-level market-to-book-value 
ratio as a proxy for δ. If book value serves as a rough measure of fundamentals, a high market-
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to-book suggests that the country’s stock market may be overvalued.5 Market-to-book is 
inversely related to future equity returns in the cross-section of US stocks (Basu (1983), Fama 
and French (1992)) and international stocks (Fama and French (1998)). Also, the aggregate US 
market-to-book ratio is inversely related to subsequent market returns (Kothari and Shanken 
(1997), Pontiff and Schall (1998)). These results are consistent with the idea that extreme values 
of market-to-book represent, in part, misvaluations that subsequently correct. Extreme values of 
market-to-book are directly connected to extreme investor expectations by La Porta (1996), La 
Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Frankel and Lee (1998). With such results 
in mind, we start with regressions of the type 
ijt
it
ijt eB
MbaFDI 11ˆˆ ++= . (2) 
Of course, a positive and significant coefficient does not prove that b>0, since 
itit
it
d
B
M φδ ++= , (3) 
where the coefficients on δ and φ are normalized to be one. (To ease the exposition, we assume 
that there is no measurement error in M/B; spherical measurement error will reduce the power of 
our tests. We also note that M/B is exchange rate invariant.) In other words, while the market-to-
book ratio may be a good proxy for δ, it is also a good proxy for the other omitted country 
characteristics that influence FDI. For example, some theories of FDI link investment to host 
country GDP, tax rates, and factor endowments, and these fundamentals may be correlated with 
the stock market. As a result, b1 will be a biased estimator of b. Some of these effects we can 
control for directly in eq. (2), but some omitted variable bias will inevitably remain.  
                                                 
5A country-level price-earnings or price-dividend ratio could also be used as a proxy for misvaluation. Scaling by 
book equity seems preferable since it ensures that the denominator is positive and it reduces the influence of 
transient fluctuations in profits or payouts.  
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For example, it is particularly challenging to control for the rational expectations version 
of the “wealth effect” in Froot and Stein (1991), further studied by Klein and Rosengren (1994), 
Dewenter (1995), and Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002). This theory focuses on information 
problems in financial contracting that cause external financing to be more costly than internal 
financing, but it maintains an assumption of globally integrated and informationally efficient 
capital markets. In this theory, FDI patterns are driven by cross-country differences in firms’ 
collateralizable wealth, or financial slack. Positive shocks to relative wealth, as might result from 
unhedged exchange rate changes or, more interestingly, stock market fluctuations, allow firms in 
the relative-wealth-increasing country to escape borrowing constraints and outbid firms in the 
relative-wealth-decreasing country for domestic assets.  
To address the generic omitted variable bias, we take two approaches. The first is to use 
the future returns on the source country stock market as a cleaner proxy for mispricing. The idea 
is that, if the stock market were overvalued at the end of 1990, we would expect lower returns in 
subsequent years as the mispricing is eventually corrected. Unfortunately, there is no a priori 
notion of the exact horizon over which to expect correction. Too short a horizon leaves open the 
possibility that the mispricing has not yet corrected, while too long reduces power in a short time 
series. We use one-year-ahead returns to match the collection period of our FDI data. This is also 
consistent with the results of Kothari and Shanken (1997) and Pontiff and Schall (1998), who 
find that aggregate market-to-book forecasts one-year-ahead returns.  
Putting this in the context of eq. (1), we view returns at t+1 as a function of δ at time t, 
121 ++ ++= ititit feR εδ , (4) 
where f<0, i.e. overvaluation at time t leads to lower average returns in t+1. Here, we assume that 
future returns are not related to fundamentals φ. In other words, we assume that countries with a 
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higher level of human capital, legal or technological development, or growth opportunities do 
not have systematically lower returns.6 Our first approach to omitted variable bias is then to 
regress market-to-book on future returns and use the fitted values to explain FDI,  
ijt
it
ijt eB
MbaFDI 22
ˆˆˆ ++= . (5) 
Since the fitted values are uncorrelated with φ, this gives us an unbiased estimate of b. 
Our second solution to omitted variable bias addresses a potential shortcoming of the 
first: that the correlation between φ and ε2 is not zero. That is, suppose investors are routinely too 
optimistic when underlying investment opportunities are genuinely good—the recent US Internet 
bubble fits this pattern. Under this story, future returns and FDI could be connected without any 
causality from δ to FDI.7 To address this possibility, our second approach exploits cross-country 
variation in capital market openness and the omitted variable bias in eq. (2) to put a lower bound 
on the magnitude of b.  
To illustrate, we start by substituting eq. (3) into eq. (1) to get a clearer view of the 
omitted variable bias. Without loss of generality, we can substitute for φ, obtaining  
( ) ( ) ijtjtHitS
it
SSijt ccbB
McdcaFDI 1εφδ ++−++−= . (6) 
                                                 
6 The orthogonality conditions are that the correlations between δ and ε2, and between φ and ε2, are zero. 
7 Another critique of our first approach is that M/B might predict returns because it is capitalizing the “rational” 
discount rate for assets in that country—lower costs of capital imply higher M/B and lower required (expected 
future) returns. Keep in mind that our null hypothesis is efficient and integrated world capital markets. Under this 
null, risk premia are set on the world capital market, and variation in valuation ratios such as M/B reflect either 
variation in rational expectations of cash flows (and investment opportunities) or in the risk inherent in those cash 
flows, but not in risk premia, since they are not country-specific under the null. Put differently, while variation in a 
country’s M/B could reflect rational variation in the cost of capital of firms traded within that country, this could, 
under the null, only reflect the relatively low risk of corporate assets in that country. It does not mean that those 
firms would have any cost advantage in purchasing overseas assets (or, indeed, domestic assets), and hence there is 
no reason, under the null, for such a component of M/B to explain international capital flows. In any case, note that 
this critique is also addressed by our second approach to omitted variable bias. 
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Hence in the simple regression of FDI on market-to-book in eq. (2), the independent variable is 
not orthogonal to the residuals. The omitted variable bias takes the form: 
( ) ( )( )itBM
ititB
M
SS cbcb var
,cov
1ˆ
δ−+= , (7) 
where the ratio is the fraction of the market-to-book ratio that is explained by mispricing. As is 
intuitive, when all variation in market-to-book is due to mispricing, the coefficient is an unbiased 
estimate of b, and when mispricing is nonexistent, it is an unbiased estimate of cS.  
In perfectly integrated capital markets, arbitrage will reduce the absolute value of δ.8 This 
suggests using the degree to which the capital market is closed as an indicator of where δ might 
appear in the first place. Suppose that capital market closedness perfectly measures the extent 
(not the direction) of the mispricing problem, i.e. the fraction of country stock valuations not 
explained by fundamentals. Then we can substitute eq. (7) into eq. (2) and estimate 
( ) ijt
it
Sitijt eB
McCACbaFDI 33 ˆˆˆ +⋅++= , (8) 
where CAC measures the degree to which the capital market in country i is closed at t. b3 is not a 
direct estimate of b but of (b – cS). Thus if b3 is greater than zero, we can infer that a unit change 
in the mispricing component of market-to-book has a greater impact on FDI than a unit change in 
the fundamentals component. Of course, in the estimation below, we also control for the direct 
effect of capital restrictions to be sure that the result is coming from the interaction of valuations 
and the proxy for limits on cross-country arbitrage. 
                                                 
8 Of course, even within a single capital market, relative mispricing can appear, as demonstrated by Cornell and Liu 
(2001), Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002), Lamont and Thaler (2003), and Schill and Zhou (2001). But within a 
single market as well, mispricings are more common and more severe among securities where arbitrage is relatively 
difficult. Many examples are cited in Shleifer (2000).  
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To reiterate, our second approach to omitted variable bias uses the observation that, all 
else equal, cross-market mispricing is more likely when cross-market arbitrage is difficult, and 
takes the presence of capital restrictions as a natural proxy for this difficulty. The cheap financial 
capital hypothesis then predicts that FDI and valuations will be especially closely related when 
the source market is segmented. Other theories of FDI that assume efficient and integrated 
capital markets, including the relative wealth theory of Froot and Stein (1991), do not make this 
prediction. More generally, if the relationship between FDI and valuations is simply spurious, 
there is no reason it should strengthen in the presence of capital controls. 
Finally, a fuller version of the model would suggest that the sensitivity of FDI to the 
component of valuations that reflects mispricing would be higher when capital controls are 
operative, while the sensitivity to any residual component would not. To test this finer prediction 
we combine the two approaches, using future returns as a cleaner proxy for δ and closed capital 
markets as an instrument for the existence of mispricing: 
( ) ijt
it
iitijt eB
McCACbaFDI 44
ˆ
ˆˆˆ +⋅++= . (9) 
As before, b4 is not a direct estimate of b, but if it is positive, we infer that the component of 
market-to-book that reflects mispricing has a greater impact on FDI than the component that 
reflects fundamentals. Once again, this is a unique prediction of the misvaluation-driven FDI 
theory. Standard theories of FDI do not make predictions for b4.  
B.  FDI Data 
Direct investment is distinguished from other international capital flows by the degree to 
which the investor owns and controls the foreign enterprise. Some brief definitions may be 
useful. Direct investment is typically defined as the direct or indirect ownership or control by a 
single domestic legal entity (the parent) of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an 
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incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign 
business enterprise (the foreign affiliate). Direct investment flows are then the funds that parents 
provide to their affiliates net of the funds affiliates provide to their parents.  
Direct investment flows are of three basic types: equity capital, intercompany debt, and 
reinvested earnings. Equity capital flows include payments between parents and third parties that 
occur when parents change their ownership interests, as well as changes in the equity capital 
contribution of parents to affiliates that are wholly owned. These flows therefore capture the 
movement of capital used for cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Intercompany debt flows 
occur when parents alter the level of their net outstanding loans and trade accounts with the 
affiliate. Reinvested earnings are the parents’ claim on the current-period undistributed after-tax 
earnings of affiliates.9 Direct investment positions (i.e., stocks as opposed to flows) are the 
parents’ net financial claims on their affiliates, whether these claims take the form of equity or 
debt. For further details on these definitions, see Borga (2003). 
Our main FDI data set is drawn from the Survey of US Direct Investment Abroad and the 
Survey of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, both conducted by the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). The sample includes information on the positions and flows of FDI 
into and out of the US each year from 1974 to 2001.10 These data have some attractive features. 
The panel of flows to and from the 19 countries for which we also have stock market data 
(described below) is reasonably complete, and these data have been collected on a consistent 
                                                 
9 Our reported results are for FDI inclusive of retained earnings, but removing the retained earnings component 
leads to identical inferences (results available on request). 
10 Because those who do not comply with their survey requests are subject to fines and imprisonment, and because 
companies are reassured that the “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes 
is prohibited,” the BEA believes that these data are reasonably complete and accurate.  
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basis over time—across source countries for FDI into the US, and across hosts for FDI out of the 
US. Using the BEA data, we measure FDI flows as percentages of the initial FDI position: 
ji
t
ji
t
ijt Position
Flow
FDI →
−
→
=
1
, (10) 
where i is the source country is and j is the host.11 Since small initial positions can lead to 
outliers in this measure, we truncate it at +100 percent. Note that this variable is essentially the 
growth in the stock of FDI.  
FDI is notoriously difficult to measure; to determine robustness, we also use two other 
FDI data sets. One is based on mergers and acquisitions data from Securities Data Company 
(SDC). As noted in Nocke and Yeaple (2003) and United Nations Center for Transnational 
Corporations (1999), a large fraction of FDI flows are due to cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. The SDC sample includes transactions in which a US firm is either the target or the 
acquirer and covers 1978 through 2001, although the first half of the sample appears 
incomplete.12 We measure M&A-based FDI from the US to the UK, for example, as the number 
of acquisitions by US firms of UK firms divided by the initial number of US affiliates in the UK. 
The latter is taken from the BEA and is available from 1984 through 1999.  
                                                 
11 Like Caves (1989), we scale flows by initial country-specific stocks. Froot and Stein (1991) scale flows by GNP 
and Dewenter (1995) scales M&A flows into the US by domestic acquisition activity. Scaling by initial position 
renders the FDI measure more comparable across countries. This is not important in regressions where we include 
country fixed effects. In such regressions, we have verified that the results are essentially unchanged when we scale 
by GDP. In regressions containing future returns, however, such as those along the lines of eq. (5), we prefer not to 
use country fixed effects. We are interested in whether FDI is especially high when future returns are low. With 
country fixed effects, an alternative and less interesting interpretation would be that future FDI is low when future 
returns are low, since demeaned FDI is high. The scaling in Eq. (10) avoids this ambiguity as it removes, to a large 
extent, the impact of fixed country characteristics on the level of FDI flows.  
12 One advantage of these data is that acquirer firms are classified by their country of origin. Therefore if a firm uses 
a holding company outside of its home country to buy a firm in the US, we can classify this transaction as taking 
place between the acquirer’s home country and the US. The FDI flow and position data do not trace investment back 
to the country of parent origin.  
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We also use a panel of FDI flows and positions from the OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistics database. These data include the outflows and outward position of OECD 
countries’ FDI with respect to a broad set of host countries, not only OECD members. This 
sample covers 1980 through 2001. Although these data would appear to have an advantage in 
coverage, data for many country pairs are missing, and there are significant differences in how 
different countries collect and report their data. Nonetheless, results from these data may provide 
a useful sense of robustness when viewed alongside those from the other data sources. We 
measure FDI flows in these data as in eq. (10).  
The FDI data are summarized in Panel A of Table 1. The BEA data contains 407 (439) 
observations on FDI inflows into (outflows from) the US, or an average of 21.4 (23.1) years of 
data for each of the 19 non-US countries for which we also have consistent stock market data. 
The average annual FDI flows into the US from one of these countries increases its initial 
position by 20.30 percent. Likewise, on average, the annual FDI flow from the US to one of 
these countries increases its initial position by 11.56 percent. Mean M&A activity is significantly 
higher for transactions involving a US acquirer, increasing their number of affiliates by 13.83 
percent per year, than for transactions involving a US target, at 3.53 percent of lagged affiliates. 
Mean flows from OECD members amount to 17.49 percent of their initial positions.  
C.  Stock market valuations and returns 
Stock market valuations and returns are from Ken French’s website. His data include 
yearly observations of the capitalization-weighted market-to-book-equity ratio and stock market 
returns, in both dollars and local currency, for 19 countries between 1975 and 2001. For details 
of the construction of these variables see Fama and French (1998).13 We then merge in US 
                                                 
13 The raw data are from Morgan Stanley’s Capital International Perspectives (MSCI). The set of firms whose data 
is used to construct country-level returns and profitability variables is essentially the set of firms included in Morgan 
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valuations and returns, taking the market-to-book of the S&P 500 from Compustat and returns on 
the S&P 500 from the CRSP database. Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics.  
D.  Country characteristics and controls 
Other data come from several sources. The return on equity, weighted across publicly-
traded firms by book value, is from Ken French’s website. The real exchange rate is calculated 
using nominal exchange rates and price indices from the IMF International Financial Statistics. 
The exchange rate series are indexed with the dollar exchange rate in 1975 set to 1 in each 
country. GDP and GDP per capita in 1995 US dollars are from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Statutory corporate income tax rates, representing the maximum 
marginal statutory corporate tax rates in that country-year, are from the World Tax Database 
maintained by the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan. Capital account 
closedness is based on Brune et al. (2001). Brune et al.’s openness index equals the number of 
nine capital account transactions that are not significantly restricted. To form a closedness index 
that matches the econometric derivation, we take nine minus Brune et al.’s index, i.e. the number 
of capital account transactions that are restricted. Panel C of Table 1 reports summary statistics. 
 
IV.  Empirical results 
A.  Valuation levels 
Table 2 starts with simple regressions, in the spirit of eq. (2), to establish the basic 
correlations between FDI and stock market valuations. The dependent variables are the BEA 
measures of FDI into and out of the US. The independent variables of interest are the source and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stanley’s stock index for that country. These tend to be large firms, and for a typical country they cover roughly 80 
percent of the domestic stock market capitalization. Depending on the country and year, the indexes are based on a 
minimum of a few dozen large firms to a maximum of several hundred; see Fama and French (1998), Table I. As 
discussed there, there is little issue of survivor bias.  
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host country market-to-book ratios. To the extent that market-to-book captures misvaluation, the 
cheap financial capital story predicts that the coefficient on the market-to-book of the source 
country stock market will be positive, while the cheap asset story predicts that the coefficient on 
the market-to-book of the host country will be negative. As discussed above, since market-to-
book picks up omitted determinants of FDI, Table 2 is not a precise test of our hypotheses, just a 
first step. At the same time, just determining the raw effects of source and host stock market 
valuations will yield some new insights, since prior work on FDI has looked only at relative 
market valuations.  
Note that the BEA data, while preferable in other respects, are not suited to testing the 
cheap financial capital and cheap assets stories simultaneously. For instance, in the left columns 
of Table 2, which study FDI into the US from 19 source countries, the source country valuations 
vary each country-year, but the host (the US) valuations vary only yearly, and so their effect 
cannot be estimated in the presence of year effects. Similarly, in the right columns, which 
examine FDI out of the US, host valuations vary at the observation level but source (the US) 
valuation effects are estimated only from the fairly short time series (27 years). Given this 
‘shape’ of the data, we rely on FDI into the US to examine the cheap financial capital hypothesis 
and on FDI out of the US to test the cheap assets story.  
The specifications in Table 2 are reminiscent of standard investment-Q equations used to 
study investment within countries, except that we can separate source and host country 
valuations. Caves (1989) and Klein and Rosengren (1994) consider the ratio of source and host 
valuations, but it is important to know whether one effect dominates. We also control for a range 
of other determinants of FDI. Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997) find that real exchange 
rates affect FDI flows into the US. We include the return on equity, as a measure of cash flow is 
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often included alongside Tobin’s Q in investment equations. Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988) and Lamont (1997) find that investment increases in internal finance, perhaps because 
external finance is more costly. The relative return on equity in the source and host countries also 
proxies for the relative attractiveness of fundamental investment opportunities. We include the 
log of GDP and GDP per capita to capture country size and wealth. Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2004) find that US multinationals move capital toward low tax locations, so we include 
corporate tax rates. Many countries impose capital account restrictions, so we include an index of 
restrictions. Finally, we use country and sometimes year effects, since factors like distance and 
other country fixed effects are motivated by models of FDI based in trade theory. 
The specifications in the left panels of Table 2 exploit heterogeneity of conditions across 
countries investing in the US. They provide preliminary support for the cheap financial capital 
hypothesis. The coefficients on the source country market-to-book are reliably positive and 
significant, irrespective of control variables and fixed effects. The coefficients are economically 
large. The standard deviation of non-US market-to-book ratios is 0.97, so a one standard 
deviation increase in source country market-to-book leads to a six to nine percentage point 
increase in FDI into the US. This compares to a mean inflow of 20.30 percentage points.14  
The right panels of Table 2 analyze FDI out of the US. Country-year level variation in 
host country conditions allow for a preliminary assessment of the cheap assets view. The results 
provide no support for this hypothesis: The coefficients on the host country market-to-book are 
                                                 
14 Prior studies of FDI flows into the US, including Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997), find a negative 
coefficient on real exchange rates. We do not find a consistent effect. This appears to be due to the sample period. 
Froot and Stein’s (1991) sample, for example, runs from 1973 to 1988. We also find a negative coefficient over this 
period. However, the negative correlation between FDI into the US and the real exchange rate breaks down in more 
recent data. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the dollar fell but FDI inflows also declined. More recently, the 
dollar has strengthened and inflows reached record levels. Klein et al. (2002) also note this shift. 
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weakly positive, not negative. The most robust coefficient is the negative effect of host country 
corporate taxes, consistent with Desai et al. (2004).15  
Table 3 reaches similar conclusions using other FDI data sets. The first two panels 
consider cross-border merger and acquisition transactions that involve a US firm as acquirer or 
target. We measure M&A into the US from a particular country as the number of US firms 
acquired by firms from that country. We scale this by the total number of US affiliates of firms 
in the source country at the start of the year. M&A activity out of the US to a particular country 
is the number of firms in a host country acquired by US firms, again scaled by the number of 
affiliates of US firms in that country at the start of the year.  
In the first panel, the coefficients on the source country market-to-book ratio are positive 
and significant, indicating that acquisitions of US firms increase when overseas stock markets 
are highly valued. This is consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theory. In the second 
panel, there is again no evidence that cross-border M&A is driven by low target valuations. US 
firms’ overseas acquisition activity does appear to be strongly dependent upon US valuations; 
this is consistent with the cheap financial capital hypothesis, although the effect is estimated 
from only a fairly short time series.  
The last panel of Table 3 studies a panel of bilateral FDI outflows among 20 developed 
countries from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics. While these data are less 
comparable across countries and time, in principle they allow us to simultaneously consider the 
cheap financial capital and cheap asset hypotheses in a broad sample. The results here are 
                                                 
15 The results here and in all subsequent tables are unchanged when we control for short- or long-term government 
interest rates using data from the Global Financial Database (results available upon request). However, since we 
could obtain interest rates only for 85 to 90 percent of our sample, we do not include them in these regressions.  
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essentially identical to those from the US-based data sets: source country valuations have a 
strong and positive influence on FDI, while host valuations are unimportant.16 
Summing up, the results thus far document an important new fact about FDI flows: there 
is a very strong positive link between source country stock market valuations and FDI. Indeed, 
the effect of source country valuations is stronger, in statistical terms, than any other determinant 
of FDI. This relationship is potentially consistent with a cheap financial capital story, and in the 
rest of the paper we probe it further. The other result is the lack of evidence of fire-sale FDI. 
However, one caveat there is the nature of our sample. Our stock market data cover 20 mostly 
developed countries. While these account for the majority of the world’s FDI flows [Feenstra 
(1999)], they may not provide the most powerful sample for testing the cheap assets story. 
Developing countries may be more prone to the extreme fluctuations that create conditions for 
fire-sale FDI. The existing evidence on the cheap assets view, Agiuar and Gopinanth (2004), is 
based exclusively on emerging markets. So, while our results certainly cast doubt on the cheap 
assets story as a general determinant of FDI, it could still be important in some circumstances.  
B.  Fundamental and non-fundamental valuations 
We now take a closer look at the strong positive effect of source country valuations on 
FDI. At face value, this is consistent with the cheap financial capital hypothesis, but it is also 
consistent with many other explanations, since stock market valuations may pick up not only 
misvaluation but also many omitted “fundamental” determinants of investment. Here we use 
future stock returns as an instrument for the component of market-to-book that reflects 
mispricing, the identifying approach discussed in eqs. (4) and (5). For brevity, we focus on the 
                                                 
16 An F-test confirms that the absolute value of the two coefficients is not equal, inconsistent with the “relative 
wealth” hypothesis.  
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BEA data on FDI flows into the US, which offers the most variation in source country 
valuations.17 
As discussed previously, the idea behind this approach is that mispricing ex ante is can be 
detected from the returns that correct the mispricing ex post. If future returns are negatively 
correlated with ex ante mispricing and otherwise uncorrelated with measurement error in market-
to-book, the fitted values from the first stage serve as a purer measure of mispricing. The first 
stage regression of market-to-book on one-year-ahead dollar returns yields 
172.082.1
ˆ
+−= it
it
R
B
M , (11) 
with 426 observations and a heteroskedasticity robust t-statistic of 5.07 on the –0.72 coefficient. 
The residual, and more likely fundamental, component of the market-to-book ratio is 
ititit B
M
B
M
B
M ˆ~ −= . (12) 
In decomposing valuations into fundamental and non-fundamental components in this way, we 
assume that mispricing is completely corrected in the next year. If it takes longer, a portion of the 
mispricing component will remain in the residuals in eq. (12), and the decomposition will be 
conservative, making it harder to find support for the misvaluation theories.  
Table 4 reports the second stage estimation. The results suggest that FDI flows are 
positively related to both the fundamental and nonfundamental components of stock market 
valuations. The nonfundamental coefficient in Table 4 is about 2.5 times as large as the residual 
M/B coefficient. (F-tests indicate that this difference is significant at the 10 percent level in the 
last two specifications.) Both effects remain strong when additional controls and year effects are 
included. Since the standard deviation of the nonfundamental component of M/B is only 21 
                                                 
17 A broader set of results is available upon request. 
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percent that of the residual component, a very rough estimate of overall economic significance 
would be that, according to this methodology, mispricing appears half (2.5 times 0.21 equals 
0.52) as important as the fundamental component of source country valuations in explaining FDI 
flows. This strikes us as a magnitude that is both interesting and plausible.  
It is worth noting that the significant coefficient on nonfundamental market-to-book 
indicates that FDI predicts lower returns in the source stock market. When one views the results 
in this way, it becomes clear that they would be difficult to explain within existing theories of 
FDI, rooted in rational expectations and efficient and integrated world capital markets.18 
C.  Limits to cross-market arbitrage 
While the future returns results are increasingly suggestive that FDI is affected by cheap 
financial capital, they cannot completely rule out a spurious correlation. The key identifying 
assumption is that future returns are uncorrelated with omitted country characteristics that 
influence FDI. However, this need not be the case if investors are routinely too optimistic when 
underlying investment opportunities are good. For example, a technology shock could 
simultaneously cause FDI outflows and an overvalued stock market. We can address this 
possibility by testing whether the effect of source country valuations is relatively more 
pronounced where capital account restrictions are relatively more severe. The idea is that such 
restrictions limit cross-market arbitrage, making extreme values of market-to-book in the 
presence of such restrictions more likely to reflect mispricing. Put differently, we can use capital 
account closedness as an instrument for the existence of mispricing, not the direction.  
                                                 
18 We have explicitly confirmed that FDI flows into the US could be used to predict source country returns (with a 
negative sign). A table is available on request. We have also verified that these results are not driven by the small-
sample bias in return prediction regressions discussed in Nelson and Kim (1993), Kothari and Shanken (1997), and 
Stambaugh (1999).  
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Table 5 runs regressions that interact valuation ratios with an index of capital account 
closedness. In Tables 5 and 6, we standardize this variable to have zero mean and unit variance. 
The left columns show that capital account restrictions tend to increase the effect of source 
country market-to-book, with a significant effect in the first specification and a marginally 
significant effect in the second. The interaction is not significant in the third specification. 
(Remember that, as discussed in detail in the methodology section, this test can only detect an 
effect if the coefficient on the mispricing component of M/B is actually larger than the 
fundamental piece. Hence, an insignificant result is not a rejection of the premise.) However, 
based on an F-test, this specification implies that at the lowest level of the capital account 
restrictions index, which characterizes about 10 percent of the sample, the source country 
aggregate market-to-book-value ratio is no longer a significant determinant of FDI.  
The effect of capital account restrictions comes through more sharply when we combine 
empirical strategies, using future returns to hone in on the mispricing component of market-to-
book and looking at the effect of that component in the presence of capital account restrictions. 
The results are in the right columns of Table 5. In each specification, the coefficients on the 
fitted component of source country market-to-book, and on its interactions with capital account 
restrictions, are positive and significant. Meanwhile, the coefficients on the fundamental 
component of valuations are positive and significant, but the interaction terms are not. This 
pattern of results accords closely with predictions. It suggests that the strategy of using capital 
account restrictions and future returns to identify mispricing is successful, and provides fairly 
convincing evidence that FDI is increased by the presence of cheap financial capital.19  
                                                 
19 We find similar results if the capital control indicator from the IMF is used in place of the Brune et al. (2001) 
measure. Also, Japan’s FDI to the U.S. reached very high levels prior to the decline of the Japanese stock market 
and the relaxation of some Japanese capital controls. While this pattern is consistent with a cheap financial capital 
channel, the results do not depend on having Japan in the sample; they are qualitatively similar if it is dropped. 
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One last robustness check involves the fact that capital account restrictions take several 
forms, including restrictions on FDI outflows. While we already control for restrictions directly, 
it may be useful to verify that the interaction results in Table 5 come about through the ability of 
CAC to identify mispricing and not through a mechanical (nonlinear) effect on FDI. Table 6 
investigates this issue using alternative indices of capital account restrictions. We consider three 
alternatives. One specifically excludes all FDI restrictions (inward and outward); one includes 
only outward FDI restrictions; and one includes only restrictions on capital and money market 
securities. The results show that excluding FDI restrictions makes little difference to the 
interaction coefficients, compared to those in Table 5. Likewise, an index based solely on 
restrictions on FDI outflows has no interesting interactive effects. This confirms that restrictions 
on FDI outflows are not driving the effects documented earlier. Rather, much of the effect of the 
overall index appears to be coming through capital and money market transaction restrictions, as 
suggested in the last columns of Table 6. This again is consistent with the cheap financial capital 
hypothesis. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Most of the modern literature on foreign direct investment assumes that global capital 
markets are informationally efficient and integrated; meanwhile, evidence casting doubt on that 
assumption has accumulated, and a large literature on how mispricing affects corporate 
investment and acquisition patterns within the US has developed. This paper is among the first to 
consider whether and how mispricing affects FDI, or investment and acquisitions across borders. 
We outline two types of mispricing-driven FDI. The cheap assets view emphasizes 
undervaluation of host country assets, while the cheap financial capital view emphasizes 
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overvaluation of source country firms. To test these theories, we exploit country-year variation in 
stock market valuations, realized returns (which contain ex post information about ex ante 
mispricing), and limits to cross-market arbitrage. The results indicate that FDI is strongly related 
to source country stock market valuations and, in particular, the component of valuations that 
reflects mispricing. These findings suggest the existence of a significant cheap financial capital 
effect and thereby add to the list of known determinants of FDI.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. Means, medians, standard deviations, and extreme values for foreign direct 
investment, stock market valuations and returns, and country characteristics. Panel A summarizes three sources of 
data on foreign direct investment. FDIiUSt and FDIUSit are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and report annual 
FDI flows in which the US is the host or the source country, respectively. FDI flows are measured here as the gross 
FDI flow as a percentage of the beginning of year stock. M&AiUSt and M&AiUSt are from SDC and measure cross-
border mergers and acquisitions activity involving US firms as targets or acquirers, respectively. M&A flows are 
expressed as the number of new affiliates acquired as a percentage of the number of affiliates existing at the 
beginning of the year. FDIijt is a full panel of bilateral FDI flows among developed countries from OECD 
International Direct Investment Statistics. FDI flows are measured here as the gross FDI flow as a percentage of the 
beginning of year stock. Panel B shows stock market valuations and returns data. International stock market returns 
in dollar and local terms, Rit, and the average market-equity-to-book-equity ratio of public firms, M/Bit, are from 
Ken French’s website and are based on data from Morgan Stanley’s Capital International Perspectives (MSCI). We 
use the S&P 500 return from CRSP and the S&P 500 market-to-book ratio from Compustat to merge in US values. 
Panel C summarizes country characteristics and control variables for a sample of country-years that represents the 
intersection between the stock market data and the BEA data on FDI into the US. For non-US countries, the return 
on equity ROEi is from Ken French’s website and based on MSCI data. US values for the S&P 500 are from 
Compustat. The real exchange rate is from IMF International Financial Statistics and is in units of foreign currency 
per US dollar, with the index set to 1 for 1975. GDP and GDP per capita measured in constant 1995 US dollars are 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Non-US income tax rates Taxi are from the World Tax 
Database maintained by the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan. US income tax rates are 
from the NBER. The index of capital account closedness CACit is from Brune et al. (2001).  
 
 N Mean Median SD Min Max 
 Panel A. Foreign direct investment 
FDIiUSt (%)  407 20.30 16.29 26.91 -70.97 100.00 
FDIUSit (%) 439 11.56 9.60 13.94 -33.78 100.00 
M&AiUSt (%)  286 3.53 2.66 3.48 0.00 20.91 
M&AUSit (%) 286 13.83 8.28 17.94 0.00 100.00 
FDIijt (%)  2,706 17.49 12.15 30.25 -100.00 100.00 
 Panel B. Stock market valuations and returns 
M/Bit 407 1.81 1.66 0.97 0.37 9.84 
M/BUSt 407 3.14 2.73 1.78 1.20 7.01 
Rit+1 (%, Dollar) 388 15.01 11.81 29.25 -47.07 135.80 
Rit+1 (%, Local) 388 16.14 13.76 27.08 -39.42 153.67 
RUSt+1 (%, Dollar) 388 14.91 20.42 14.77 -11.09 35.71 
 Panel C. Country characteristics and controls 
ROEit (%) 407 12.08 11.73 3.94 3.47 31.75 
ROEUSt (%) 407 16.19 14.99 4.06 10.65 22.98 
Exrateit (1975=1) 407 1.04 1.01 0.20 0.56 1.69 
GDPit ($B1990) 407 803 297 1,140 29 5,680 
GDP/Capit ($1990) 407 24,890 23,821 8,330 10,742 47,064 
Taxit (%) 407 34.77 35.00 10.97 5.43 56.00 
CACit 407 3.76 3.00 2.83 0.00 9.00 
Table 2. FDI and Stock Market Valuations. Regressions of FDI into and out of the US on the local market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, and 
controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in Table 1. The first six columns show regressions explaining FDI flows into the US. The 
second six columns show regressions explaining FDI flows out of the US. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces. 
 
 FDI into the US (FDIiUSt) FDI out of the US (FDIUSit) 
 coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
             
M/Bit 6.29 [2.98] 9.86 [5.63] 8.05 [3.99] 0.75 [1.32] 0.63 [0.61] 0.57 [0.33] 
M/BUSt -2.31 [-2.17] 0.47 [0.29]   1.22 [0.91] 1.35 [0.89]   
ROEit   -1.17 [-2.23] -1.21 [-2.20]   0.62 [3.02] 0.31 [1.23] 
ROEUSt   0.95 [2.20]     0.08 [0.35]   
Exrateit   0.03 [0.33] -0.23 [-1.40]   -0.06 [-1.58] -0.05 [-1.05] 
log(GDP)it   5.12 [0.15] 14.02 [0.39]   -5.82 [-0.89] -3.26 [-0.46] 
GDP/Capit   -3.26 [-2.47] -3.67 [-2.77]   -0.40 [-0.89] -0.15 [-0.34] 
Taxit   -0.14 [-0.60] -0.20 [-0.87]   -0.23 [-2.04] -0.25 [-2.13] 
CACit   -0.21 [-0.24] -0.97 [-1.04]   -0.34 [-1.06] -0.63 [-1.75] 
             
Fixed effects:             
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
             
N  407  407  407  439  439  439 
R2  0.07  0.15  0.23  0.08  0.13  0.17 
Table 3. FDI and Stock Market Valuations: Alternative Data Sources. The first two panels show regressions of 
M&A activity into and out of the US on the local market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, and controls. 
The M&A data are from the SDC. Panel A shows regressions explaining M&A activity into the US. Panel B shows 
regressions explaining M&A activity out of the US. The last panel shows regressions of FDI between 20 developed 
countries on the source country market-to-book ratio, the host country market-to-book ratio, and controls. The FDI 
data are from the OECD. The control variables are return on equity in the source and host country, and the exchange 
rate, log of GDP, GDP per capita, tax rates, and capital controls in the source country. All variables are summarized 
in Table 1. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces.  
 
 Excluding controls Including controls 
 coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
 Panel A. M&A into the US (M&AiUSt) 
M/Bit 1.89 [8.36] 1.63 [6.05] 1.64 [5.61] 
M/BUSt 0.12 [1.34] -0.18 [1.21]   
       
Fixed effects:       
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  No  No  Yes 
       
N  286  286  286 
R2  0.74  0.78  0.82 
 Panel B. M&A out of the US (M&AUSjt) 
M/Bjt 0.59 [0.53] 3.42 [0.35] -0.70 [-0.68] 
M/BUSt 5.56 [10.03] 5.55 [5.69]   
       
Fixed effects:       
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  No  No  Yes 
       
N  286  286  286 
R2  0.69  0.73  0.74 
 Panel C. Bilateral FDI flow (FDIijt) 
M/Bit 4.14 [6.73] 6.13 [5.76] 4.79 [4.04] 
M/Bjt -0.40 [-0.56] 0.79 [0.88] 0.52 [0.53] 
       
Fixed effects:       
Country (i and j)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  No  No  Yes 
       
N  2,706  2,706  2,706 
R2  0.06  0.07  0.09 
Table 4. FDI and Stock Market Valuations: Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Components. Regressions of 
FDI into the US on the source country market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, and controls. The FDI 
data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in Table 1. We decompose the source country market-to-book 
ratio into a non-fundamental or mispricing component (Fitted M/Bit) and a fundamental component (Residual 
M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a first stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 
1.82 – 0.72Rit+1 (N=426, t-stat=5.07). Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces. 
 
 FDI into the US (FDIiUSt) 
 coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
       
Fitted M/Bit 17.58 [2.85] 21.70 [3.31] 22.00 [2.82] 
Residual M/Bit 7.60 [4.54] 9.52 [4.81] 8.72 [3.28] 
M/BUSt -2.06 [-2.15] -2.80 [-2.12]   
ROEit   -0.54 [-1.19] -0.61 [-1.27] 
ROEUSt   0.81 [1.61]   
Exrateit   0.11 [1.54] -0.01 [-0.13] 
log(GDP)it   0.38 [0.22] -0.26 [-0.15] 
GDP/Capit   -0.50 [-2.65] -0.48 [-2.52] 
Taxit   -0.06 [-0.41] -0.06 [-0.41] 
CACit   0.55 [1.01] 0.17 [0.28] 
       
Fixed effects:       
Year  No  No  Yes 
       
N  388  388  388 
R2  0.06  0.10  0.17 
Table 5. FDI and Stock Market Valuations: Closed Capital Accounts. Regressions of FDI into the US on the source country market-to-book ratio, the US 
market-to-book ratio, their interactions with a capital account openness index, and controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in 
Table 1. We decompose the source country market-to-book ratio into a non-fundamental or mispricing component (Fitted M/Bit) and a fundamental component 
(Residual M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a first stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 1.82 – 0.72Rit+1 (N=426, t-stat=5.07). 
Market-to-book or its components are then interacted with an index of capital account closedness from Brune et al. (2001) for the second stage regression. CAC 
is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces. 
 
 FDI into the US (FDIiUSt) 
 M/B M/B decomposition 
 Coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
             
M/Bit 7.95 [3.57] 10.93 [5.16] 8.71 [3.72]       
M/Bit · CACit 4.89 [2.04] 4.43 [1.68] 2.30 [0.88]       
Fitted M/Bit       13.40 [2.00] 18.87 [2.65] 17.07 [2.04] 
Fitted M/Bit · CACit       19.37 [3.26] 22.49 [3.86] 21.51 [3.35] 
Residual M/Bit       8.74 [4.88] 10.77 [5.05] 9.35 [3.37] 
Residual M/Bit · CACit       1.01 [0.54] 3.00 [1.48] 1.83 [0.89] 
             
Controls  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
             
Fixed effects:             
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Year  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
             
N  407  407  407  388  388  388 
R2  0.08  0.16  0.23  0.09  0.13  0.20 
Table 6. FDI and Stock Market Valuations: Alternative Definitions of Capital Account Closedness. Regressions of FDI into the US on the source country 
market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, their interactions with a capital account openness index, and controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All 
variables are summarized in Table 1. We decompose the source country market-to-book ratio into a non-fundamental or mispricing component (Fitted M/Bit) and 
a fundamental component (Residual M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a first stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 1.82 – 
0.72Rit+1 (N=426, t-stat=5.07). Market-to-book or its components are then interacted with alternative versions of the Brune et al. (2001) measure of capital 
account closedness for the second stage regression. The Brune et al. measure includes restrictions on five types of activities: invisible transactions, capital and 
money market transactions, credit market operations, FDI, and commercial banking transactions. The first four are divided into ingoing and outgoing restrictions. 
We consider measures that exclude the FDI components of the index; that are based only on capital market restrictions; and that are based only on outgoing FDI 
restrictions. Each measure is separately standardized to have zero mean and unit variance.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces. 
 
 FDI into the US (FDIiUSt) 
 M/B M/B decomposition 
 
Excluding FDI 
Outgoing FDI 
closedness 
Capital market 
closedness Excluding FDI 
Outgoing FDI 
closedness 
Capital market 
closedness 
 Coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
             
M/Bit 9.41 [3.69] 7.68 [3.79] 7.77 [3.72]       
M/Bit · CACit 3.57 [1.32] 0.75 [0.49] 3.53 [1.78]       
Fitted M/Bit       16.03 [1.88] 22.20 [2.85] 16.61 [2.00] 
Fitted M/Bit · CACit       22.89 [3.52] 1.13 [0.21] 25.92 [3.20] 
Residual M/Bit        9.60 [3.36] 8.08 [2.93] 8.38 [3.14] 
Residual M/Bit · CACit       1.97 [0.93] 1.19 [0.76] 2.15 [1.19] 
             
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Fixed effects:             
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
N  407  407  407  388  388  388 
R2  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.21  0.18  0.21 
 
